A reality based independent journal of observation & analysis, serving the Flathead Valley & Montana since 2006. © James Conner.

2 August 2018 — 1601 mdt

Hand counted paper ballots cannot be hacked.
Computerized voter registration databases can.

Electronic voting machines, and machines that count paper ballots (the system we use in Montana), can be hacked. They also can be programmed incorrectly, a mistake that can have the same outcome as a hack.

The remedy is simple, but labor intensive: paper ballots counted by hand. That process introduces other paths to error, but it cannot be tampered with by a cyberwarrior entering commands in a laptop in Moscow.

Conducting the 2020 presidential election by hand counted paper ballots is feasible. Other elections could be conducted with electronic voting machines and machine counted paper ballots.

Protecting voter registration databases is a tougher proposition. Very small localities, such as Montana’s Petroleum County (421 registered voters), could maintain a card file database without much fuss, but voting registrars in larger jurisdictions would have a cerebral hemorrhage at the mere thought of reverting to card files to secure their voter registration databases. As a practical matter, protecting voter registration databases requires beefed-up computer security, which requires additional expense and is accompanied by exasperating inconvenience.

Making voter registration databases more secure will require time and money. In the short term, frequently storing clean copies of the data offline and offsite makes sense, and undoubtedly is the backup policy and practice at most election departments.

But there’s an additional step that could further protect voter registration data: converting it to a paper printout or to microfilm, probably on a semi-annual basis. That entails greater expense and trouble, but limits the damage that could be done were hackers to encrypt the computer files and hold them for ransom.

Early voting begins in ten weeks in Montana. Other states have similar timelines. At this point, an infusion of large amounts of cash probably cannot produce large gains in election security. Forget new legislation. Our options are limited to adhering to best practices, conducting post election audits, keeping an eye peeled for trouble, and after the election, preparing proposals for the next legislature and congress.